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Temporary Labour Migration Programmes (TLMPs) are controversial because they are caught 
in a dilemma between global and domestic justice. From a global justice perspective, TLMPs 
expand opportunities for workers in poor countries to access labour markets of rich countries 
and they improve the situation of origin countries through remittances. From a domestic justice 
perspective, TLMPs violate principles of domestic equality because they always afford migrant 
workers more restricted rights than those enjoyed by citizens and long-term residents of the 
host country. Although this dilemma cannot be fully resolved, we argue that TLMPs can be 
morally justified and recommended if they are characterized by ‘fair representation’ in policy 
design and implementation and also meet certain democratic legitimacy conditions. TLMPs 
can be justified if they provide triple benefits for destination and origin countries as well as for 
migrants themselves, yet the relevant benefits can only be achieved cooperatively through 
transnational governance in which each of the three groups of actors is fairly represented. This 
conclusion is supported by our interpretation of the democratic principle of including all affected 
interests. Under such conditions, some rights of temporary migrant workers in host countries 
can be regarded as a legitimate outcome of negotiations, while others need to be fixed in 
advance under a democratic principle of equal protection of all subjected to the laws. 
Democratic legitimacy also requires that migrants enjoy protection and participation rights as 
citizens of their countries of origin as well as local citizenship in their countries of residence. 
Keywords 






Europe and the United States are, once again, debating the expansion of temporary labour 
migration programmes (henceforth TLMPs), especially for admitting lower-skilled migrant 
workers (see .e.g. Bier 20211; European Commission 20202; The Economist 20203). We define 
TLMPs as policies that grant migrant workers temporary residence and work permits upon 
arrival, employ migrants under a restricted set of rights, and do not guarantee an ‘upgrade’ to 
permanent residence after some time. This paper makes a novel contribution to long-standing 
debates about the ethical desirability of TLMPs. We propose a new normative framework and 
ask whether ‘fair representation’ in the design and implementation of TLMPs can address the 
underlying moral dilemma of how to balance global and domestic justice concerns, and thus 
also justify variations in the specific content of such policies. 
TLMPs have a long and global history (e.g. Hahamovitch 2003) and they are today the 
dominant form of labour immigration policy-making in high-income countries (e.g. Ruhs 2013). 
Research and policy debates about TLMPs have evolved over time, as has the terminology 
used to describe and discuss them. Most research on ‘guest worker’ policies in the United 
States (most notably the Bracero programme in 1942-64) and Europe (the Gastarbeiter 
programmes from the 1950s up to the mid-1970s) concluded that these programmes largely 
failed because they did not achieve their stated policy aims and instead generated a range of 
adverse impacts, including the emergence of labour market distortions and segmentations 
(e.g. Piore 1979) along with the growth of a structural dependence on the continued 
employment of migrant workers in the host country, and permanent settlement of many 
supposedly temporary migrant workers. The slogan “there is nothing more permanent than 
temporary foreign workers” was a popular summary statement of the perceived failure of these 
policies in democratic high-income countries the late 20th century (see, e.g. Castles 1986; 
Martin and Teitelbaum 2001). At the same time, the large-scale guest worker policies of the 
Gulf States, which were more successful in ensuring the temporariness and return of migrant 
workers, were widely considered as unacceptable in democratic countries.  
The early 2000s saw the emergence of new research and policy debates that moved 
beyond “what went wrong” and the “inevitable failure” of TLMPs (e.g. Castles 2004) to 
questions about whether and how new TLMPs can be designed to avoid the adverse 
consequences of past guest worker policies (e.g. Martin 2003; Ruhs 2006). Much of this debate 
was driven by international organisations and initiatives concerned with liberalizing labour 
migration around the world, especially for lower-skilled workers. For example, the Global 
Commission on International Migration, a body encouraged by then UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan in 2003, concluded that “states and the private sector should consider the option of 
introducing carefully designed temporary migration programmes as a means of addressing the 
economic needs of both countries of origin and destination” (GCIM 2005, p. 16). Similarly, the 
World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) called for the expansion of 
 
* This Working Paper is part of the ‘Dilemmas’ project at the Migration Policy Centre (MPC), European 
University Institute (EUI) https://migrationpolicycentre.eu/projects/dilemmas. For their helpful comments, we 
would like to thank Julia Mourão Permoser and the participants in workshops at the European University 
Institute and UC Louvain. 
1 See https://www.cato.org/blog/bidens-bill-wont-solve-future-illegal-immigration-without-guest-workers  
2 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1601287338054&uri=COM%3A2020%3A609%3AFIN  
3 See https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/01/18/americas-guest-worker-boom  
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TLMPs, especially for lower skilled workers, because of the large benefits of migration for 
poverty reduction and human development (World Bank 2006; UNDP 2009). 
In more recent years, research and policy debates about TLMPs have been expanded to 
include ‘circular migration programmes’ which facilitate temporary but repeated stays of 
migrant workers (e.g. European Migration Network 2011) and international ‘skills partnerships’ 
that combine temporary labour migration with skills training and development in origin 
countries (e.g. Clemens 2015). The recent Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December in 2018, calls on governments 
to implement labour mobility schemes for “temporary, seasonal, circular, and fast-track 
programmes in areas of labour shortages” (GCM 2018). The need for cooperation between 
countries of migrants’ destination and origin in the design and implementation of TLMPs has 
become an increasingly important new feature in policy debates. For example, the EU’s “New 
Pact on Migration and Asylum” calls for expanded cooperation between the EU and non-EU 
countries on labour migration (European Commission 20204).  
This shift in research and policy debates over the past 20 years towards greater 
engagement with the question of how policy design might improve the outcomes of TLMPs, 
and towards a greater emphasis on the need for cooperation between destination and origin 
countries, has led to a growing body of normative analyses of such programmes (e.g. Chang 
2002; Mayer 2005; Bell 2006; Carens 2008 and 2013; Lenard and Straehle 2010; Lenard 2012; 
Ruhs 2013; Miller 2008 and 2016; etc.). This paper contributes to this growing literature. Our 
starting point is that, from a normative perspective, TLMPs raise a fundamental dilemma 
between global and domestic justice.  
From a global justice perspective, TLMPs expand opportunities for workers in poor 
countries to access labour markets of rich countries, thus improving their and their families’ 
household incomes and human development. At the same time, from a domestic justice 
perspective, TLMPs violate principles of domestic equality because, regardless of their design, 
they always afford migrant workers more restricted rights than those enjoyed by citizens and 
long-term residents of the host country. As we discuss in section 2, most TLMPs, especially 
those for admitting lower-skilled migrant workers, restrict migrants’ right to free choice of 
employment, access to the welfare state, opportunities for family reunification, and – most 
obviously – security of residence in the host country.  
The guest worker programmes of the 20th century were designed to maximize the benefits 
for host states and paid less regard to the interests of migrants and source countries even if 
these were claimed as beneficial side effects. New advocacy of TLMPs in the 21st century 
invokes instead the ‘triple win’ for all three categories of actors involved. However, host country 
interests have remained dominant in the creation and operation of TLMPs. If the justification 
of TLMPs requires benefits for migrants and source countries, it is not likely that these can be 
secured in the prevailing pattern of bilateral treaties.  
Most existing normative analyses of TLMPs are focused on issues related to policy design, 
especially on the question which rights of temporary migrant workers can be justifiably 
restricted and for how long. For example, Carens (2008, 2013) suggests that it is justifiable to 
restrict some specific rights of temporary migrant workers including their access to non-
contributory welfare benefits (such as social housing) for some time. Martin Ruhs (2013) and 
Gillian Brock (2020) similarly discuss a list of rights and their permissible restrictions that could 
justify TLMPs. We take a different approach in this paper. We argue that TLMPs that realize 




The Elusive Triple Win: Can temporary labour migration dilemmas be settled through fair representation? 
European University Institute 3 
but can also be normatively recommended provided they meet some conditions that we specify 
in this paper. We take the concept of ‘triple benefits’ seriously and ask: What are the 
substantive and procedural conditions for TLMPs to be justified on these grounds? 
In our response to the dilemma of balancing domestic and global justice concerns we aim 
to overcome the opposition between sovereign immigration control and global utilitarianism. 
While the former view prioritizes rights of destination states to choose whether to admit labour 
migrants, how many and under what conditions, the latter prioritizes benefits for source 
countries and prospective migrants over standards of social justice in host countries. As an 
alternative we propose that destination states have global justice duties which they can partly 
deliver through well-designed TLMPs that are compatible with their domestic obligations of 
social justice. The triple benefit should not be interpreted only in utilitarian terms as a strategy 
for the overall maximization of welfare, but as the condition under which it is possible to 
reconcile domestic with global justice concerns. 
A second element of our response is that the normative acceptability of TLMPs is not merely 
a matter of social justice but also of democratic legitimacy. We reject views that consider 
democratic inclusion only in relation to the host state (e.g. Walzer 1983). We argue instead 
that TLMPs should satisfy three principles of democratic inclusion. First, all relevant affected 
interests must be included through fair representation of destination countries, source 
countries and temporary migrants in negotiating TLMPs. Second, in destination states 
temporary migrants must be included not as future citizens but as subjects to the laws. This 
requires that they are granted equal protection by the laws and opportunities to contest these 
laws. The third principle of democratic inclusion is that temporary migrants are citizenship 
stakeholders in their countries of origin. These countries have duties to help them realize their 
life projects and to involve them in shaping the future of these societies. The principles of 
including all subjected to the law and all citizenship stakeholders apply to destination and origin 
states respectively and determine substantive conditions for justifiability of TLMPs, 
independently of the outcome of fair negotiations shaping the specific content of such 
programmes.  
We develop our argument in four steps. We begin, in section 2, with a discussion of the 
‘anatomy’ and sources of the dilemma at the heart of TLMPs, drawing on relevant empirical 
research. Next, section 3 reviews existing normative responses to the dilemma raised by 
TLMPs and discusses difficulties with assessing whether TLMPs generate ‘triple-benefits’ for 
migrants as well as their countries of origin and destination. We then develop our normative 
argument on domestic and global justice conditions (section 4) and democratic legitimacy 
conditions (section 5) for TLMPs. The conclusion identifies and discusses briefly some of the 
practical challenges with designing and implementing TLMPs that meet the justice and 
democratic legitimacy conditions we identify in this paper. We conclude that our proposed new 
approach to TLMPs can help to address, but never fully resolve the inescapable ethical 
dilemma that such programmes raise under real world conditions.  
2. Anatomy of the dilemma: Expanded migration under restricted rights  
Most TLMPs are unilateral programmes that are designed and implemented by destination 
countries. Where bilateral programmes exist (and their number has grown in recent years, see 
e.g. Peters 2019; Chilton and Posner 2018), most of the bargaining power has remained with 
host rather than origin countries. As a consequence, the vast majority of today’s TLMPs are 
largely ‘made’ in host countries. They are typically consequentialist policies designed to benefit 
primarily the interests of the host country’s population alone. A key objective of all TLMPs is to 
promote economic growth, partly through helping to fill labour and skill shortages, in the host 
country. A second objective, the practical significance of which varies across countries and 
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over the business cycle, is distributional, i.e. to make sure that TLMPs do not harm (certain 
groups of) domestic workers.  
While there are considerable variations in the policy design of TLMPs around the word (see 
e.g. Ruhs 2018), all such programmes are characterized by a fundamental trade-off: they 
provide opportunities for labour migration while at the same time restricting at least some of 
the admitted workers’ rights (compared to the rights of citizens and log-term residents in the 
host country). By definition, migrants’ right to reside in the host country is time-limited, at least 
initially. Many countries allow some migrants admitted through TLMPs to transfer to permanent 
residence status after some time (often after 5 years), but only if they meet certain criteria. In 
democratic countries, strictly temporary programmes, where there are no opportunities at all 
for migrants to upgrade to permanent residence status, are generally limited to lower-skilled 
(including seasonal) admission programmes. In non-democratic countries, such as the oil-rich 
Gulf States, strictly temporary programmes are also used for medium and higher skilled 
migrant workers.  
Most TLMPs, except those for admitting highly skilled migrant workers5, also restrict a range 
of other rights of migrant workers. These almost always include the right to free choice of 
employment in the host country’s labour market. The vast majority of TLMPs issue work 
permits that limit the employment of the admitted migrant to the employer specified on the 
permit. Changing employers may be possible after some time, but it usually requires a new 
work permit application. From the host country’s perspective, a fundamental rationale of 
TLMPs is to help reduce labour and skills shortages in specific occupations and/or sectors. If 
the admitted migrants were free to take up employment in any occupation or sector, TLMPs 
would not be able to meet one of their fundamental objectives. Some countries (such as 
Ireland) have introduced policies that allow temporary migrant workers to switch employers 
freely within certain sectors or occupations after some time (e.g. one year after admission 
under the TLMP). However, even when the initial tie between worker and specific employer is 
lifted, the restriction on employment to the occupations or sectors perceived to be in ‘shortage’ 
typically remains. 
Most TLMPs also restrict migrants’ access to welfare benefits, especially to targeted and 
non-contributory benefits such as social housing and social assistance. Again, the extent to 
which access to welfare is constrained varies across countries but there are at least some 
restrictions in most countries. Two rationales are usually given by policy-makers for these 
restrictions (see the discussion in Ruhs 2013). The first relates to material effects, specifically 
to the fiscal costs of providing temporary migrants with access to welfare benefits. The 
common policy objective of “maximizing the net-benefits from labour immigration” typically 
includes “minimizing the fiscal costs” – and in many countries this objective is pursed partly 
through restrictions of migrants’ access to certain welfare benefits, especially for lower-skilled 
workers (although typically not to basic public services such as primary health care).  
A second reason for why many countries restrict, at least temporarily, some welfare benefits 
for migrants admitted under TLMPs relates to normative ideas, including perceptions of 
fairness and justice among the host country’s population. Welfare states have been designed 
as inherently national projects that are based on a social contract between citizens and the 
state and that redistribute from rich to poor among citizens (and often also including long-term 
residents). While the preferred principles for redistribution among existing residents (e.g. 
based on ‘need’, ‘reciprocity’, or ‘universal access’) vary across countries, when it comes to 
regulating newly arrived migrants’ access to welfare benefits, there is a popular and 
 
5 Most countries (Sweden is a partial exception) have different TLMPs for admitting low- and higher skilled 
migrant workers. TLMPs for admitting higher skilled workers tend to be more open and grant migrants more 
rights than TLMPs for lower-skilled workers (Ruhs 2013).  
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widespread view among the populations of many net immigration countries that prior 
contribution and reciprocity should be the guiding principles (see e.g. Reeskens and Oorshot 
2012). In other words, new migrants are widely seen as having to “earn their rights” to welfare 
benefits in the host country. Restricting the social rights of new migrants admitted under 
TLMPs, especially their access to needs-based welfare benefits, is therefore not only 
perceived as an issue of costs and benefits but also one that raises deep-seated questions 
about fairness and domestic justice (also see Ruhs and Palme 2018).  
Many but not all TLMPs also restrict migrants’ rights to family reunion, although this varies 
considerably across programmes targeting high- and lower-skilled workers (for the latter family 
rights are typically more restricted). In practice, a key policy tool to restrict family reunion is to 
require a minimum income threshold that migrants must meet to be able to bring their 
dependent spouses and children. How high this threshold should be has been subject of 
considerable public and policy debates in many countries (e.g. for the UK, see Sumption and 
Vargas-Silva 2016). The centrality of the minimum income threshold indicates that a key 
concern many countries have about family reunion relates to fiscal costs (rather than to issues 
of fairness or justice that are important additional considerations in the case of welfare 
benefits).  
3. Normative responses and the elusive “Triple Win”  
Most normative critiques of TLMPs are based on arguments relating to human rights, equal 
membership, and/or exploitation. From a human rights perspective, critics have argued that 
TLMPs violate the fundamental principles of universality, indivisibility and inalienability of 
human rights, and that the rights restrictions under TLMPs are often incompatible with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Family Members.6 Universalistic rights-
based normative frameworks naturally oppose the idea of different categories of residents with 
different sets of rights (see e.g. Weissbrodt 2008; Taran 2000).  
A different but equally influential critique of TLMPs is based on the idea that a democratic 
community must provide all its residents with equal terms of membership and access to 
citizenship rights. Michael Walzer (1983) famously argues that if democratic communities are 
not prepared to admit migrants as equal members, they should not admit them at all. David 
Miller (2008) makes a similar argument that also acknowledges that the requirement of equal 
membership and citizenship rights is likely to result in fewer migrant workers admitted.  
A third line of normative arguments against TLMPs is based on the idea that such 
programmes are inevitably exploitative. Exploitation can and has been defined in different 
ways. Daniel Attas (2000), for example, suggests that guest worker programmes are 
exploitative not because of a lack of political rights (which, Attas argues, are not required) but 
because they deny migrants full economic rights which gives rise to ’unequal exchange’. Attas 
suggests that giving migrants the same economic rights as local workers, including the right to 
free choice of employment, would remove the exploitative element of TLMPs. 
Most normative justifications and defenses of TLMPs have typically been based on 
a ’realistic approach’ to the ethics of migration coupled with a focus on migrant agency and 
global utilitarianism. For example Howard Chang (2002), writing about TLMPs in the United 
States, and Daniel Bell (2006), writing about TLMPs for domestic workers in East Asia, start 
with the observation that equal citizenship rights for migrant workers are politically unfeasible, 
and that the most likely alternative to TLMPs would be exclusion of migrants. Emphasizing the 
 
6 See https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/coreinstruments.aspx. The Convention has, 
however, not be signed and ratified by most immigrant receiving countries.  
Rainer Bauböck and Martin Ruhs 
6  Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
agency of migrants and the benefits of migration for individuals, both Chang and Bell support 
TLMPs that restrict some of the rights of migrant workers, under certain conditions (see also 
Ruhs 2013). Arguments for TLMPs based on global utilitarianism, i.e. based on the idea that 
TLMPs can and do generate large economic benefits for migrants and their families – are 
typically motivated by concerns with poverty reduction in poor countries (e.g. Pritchett 2006) 
and/or reducing global inequalities (e.g. Milanovic 2018).  
A key idea that is common to most existing normative justifications of TLMPs – and that 
also plays a central role in our own normative argument developed in the next two sections – 
is that TLMPs can generate ‘triple wins’ for host countries, migrants and their countries of 
origin. We prefer the terminology of ‘triple benefits’ in order to signal that we count among 
benefits that TLMPs help states to comply with duties of justice and build cooperative relations 
with other states, which would not normally be understood as ‘wins’associated with purely self-
interested goals. Our position differs from a utilitarian one in that we do not advocate a policy 
design that maximizes overall benefits but one that guarantees fair conditions under which all 
actors can mutually endorse the benefits achieved by each of them. 
Defining the meaning of ‘benefits’ for host countries, migrants and origin countries, and 
establishing that they exist under TLMPs, is by no means easy. This is because the 
consequences of migration for individuals, communities, and countries as a whole are multi-
dimensional and they can – and typically do – involve competing impacts (or trade-offs) for 
each of the three groups (host countries, migrants and countries of origin).  
For example, from the host country perspective, the employment of migrant workers 
admitted through TLMPs does not only generate a range of economic and social impacts (e.g. 
on labour markets, public finance, economic growth as well housing, community cohesion etc.) 
but has also distributional effects (e.g. different costs and benefits for different groups of people 
such as employers and workers). Moreover, we know that the impacts of labour immigration 
vary between the short- and longer-run. For example, while immigration may lower the wages 
of some competing domestic workers in the short run, it may lead to an increase in these 
workers’ wages in the longer run as labour demand adjusts to the immigration-induced 
increase in labour supply (e.g. Dustmann et al 2008). Some of these effects (e.g. labour market 
impacts) are much easier to define and measure than others (e.g. social effects). This multitude 
of impacts makes it very difficult to speak about an ‘overall impact’ (or benefit) for the host 
country. To assess the overall effect, the various types of impacts need to be considered, their 
relative importance assessed (i.e., weighted), and trade-offs need to be managed – which is 
an inherently normative exercise as it involves decisions on what type of impacts, and for what 
groups of people in the host country, should be prioritized.  
There are similar considerations and challenges with establishing the overall benefit of 
TLMPs for origin countries. Labour emigration generates remittances (which are thought to 
have mostly positive impacts on people left behind in origin countries (see e.g. Clemens and 
McKenzie 2018; Acosta et al 2006), and it can also be associated with a transfer of skills when 
migrants return. At the same time, the outflow of skilled workers can have adverse brain drain 
effects, at least for certain countries (e.g. Docquier and Rapoport 2012). Most origin countries 
perceive some responsibility for protecting the rights and welfare of their workers abroad. This 
can lead to trade-offs in perceived impacts and policy objectives vis-à-vis TLMPs: origin 
countries benefit from remittances generated by TLMPs but this may come at the price of 
restricted rights for their workers abroad. As a consequence, establishing whether a particular 
TLMP generates an overall benefit for a specific origin country is not as simple as suggested 
by some advocates of TLMPs.  
Finally, from the perspective of migrants, participation in TLMPs also involves a range of 
economic and social consequences for themselves and their families, and some of these 
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impacts may be conflicting, which complicates an overall assessment of their benefits. Perhaps 
the most obvious example is the potential trade-off between economic gains from employment 
abroad and the sometimes severe loss of rights and freedoms – as is the case with temporary 
migrant workers in the Gulf States. A second trade-off concerns family life. Migrant workers 
with families can experience family separation as a heavy burden. Often they face a dilemma 
between performing their duties of care (especially for minor children) or providing their families 
with better income through temporary migration. Here again, overall benefits are not easy to 
determine, even when assuming that temporary migrants make the choices that are best for 
them. Some of these choices may be made under conditions of insufficient information or self-
deception and migrants can come to rationally regret them in retrospect. However, it would be 
unacceptably paternalistic to assume that it is in migrants’ best interest not to participate in 
TLMPs. Instead, the goal should be to enable them to do so under conditions that will mitigate 
the trade-offs, e.g. by securing their fundamental rights in the destination country or providing 
them with multiple re-entry visa that allow them to visit their family members at home.  
If it is already hard to figure out the overall benefits for each of the three actors involved, it 
is even more difficult to weigh them up and aggregate them into an overall formula, as would 
be required by a global utilitarian calculus. We argue that this is also not necessary. As 
assessing different types of impacts of TLMPs (and migration more generally) is an inherently 
controversial and subjective process, we argue that the existence and magnitude of triple 
benefits of TLMPs cannot be determined without the involvement, or at least the representation 
of the interests, of all the affected actors (host country, origin country and migrants themselves) 
in policy design and implementation.  
Why, one may respond, is ‘revealed preference’ not enough to demonstrate the existence 
of triple benefits of TLMPs? Doesn’t the fact that migrants participate in TLMPs, and that origin 
countries seek to (and sometimes do) cooperate in TLMPs, show that such programmes 
generate benefits for all sides? The first reason why we reject this argument is the well-known 
existence of large power asymmetries between high-income host countries on the one hand, 
and lower-income sending countries and individual migrants on the other. All too often, 
destination states simply assume benefits for migrants and source countries in order to justify 
the pursuit of their own interests in TLMPs.  
Secondly, revealed preferences are not sufficient for achieving possible benefits for all sides 
if collective action problems arise. In the absence of TLMPs, labour migration is still likely to 
occur but in circumstances that lead to far less beneficial outcomes than could be achieved 
under effective and fair TLMPs. Migrants are likely to choose irregular routes, which makes 
them much worse off in terms of migration costs and protection of their rights, and undermines 
the rule of law in the host state; destination countries can damage the interests of source 
countries by poaching high skilled migrants without sharing in the costs for their human capital 
development; source countries can blackmail destination states by threatening to facilitate 
irregular migration and refusing to readmit their undocumented nationals when these are 
deported.  
When collective action dilemmas arise within states, they can be overcome by governments 
imposing cooperative solutions or creating incentives for all actors to prefer these solutions 
over defection. TLMPs, however, involve independent states and thus require coordination 
between actors that are not subjected to the same laws and do not routinely cooperate on 
multiple issues. In such contexts, what counts as a benefit for each and all of the actors must 
be established through deliberation rather than the revealed preferences formed independently 
in non-cooperate settings. We argue therefore that fair representation of interests in 
negotiating TLMPs and in their ongoing governance is crucial for determining what counts as 
triple benefits and for achieving these.  
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In a normative account we cannot, however, leave completely open what kinds of interests 
ought to be accepted by the other actors as morally justified and democratically legitimate. We 
address the question of justification in the next section and that of legitimacy in section 5.  
4. Domestic and global justice conditions for TLMPs  
A first premise in any liberal justification of TLMPs must be that the migration involved is 
voluntary. In a forthcoming book, Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana Torresi (forthcoming) criticize 
normative migration theorists for assuming that most migrants intend to stay permanently in 
their destination countries and ultimately want to become citizens of those countries (see also 
Ottonelli and Torresi 2010). They provide empirical evidence that this is generally not the case 
and argue that liberal host states ought to accommodate temporary migrants’ life projects, 
which include an intention to return after reaching specific savings targets.7 Ottonelli and 
Torresi also argue that persons can be considered as having voluntarily chosen temporary 
migration even if such choices are made under conditions of a lack of opportunities in their 
countries of origin. Regarding as involuntary all migration that happens in contexts of large 
opportunity disparities would ignore migrants’ agency and disrespect their life projects.  
However, the emphasis on migrants’ voluntary choices also leads these authors to reject 
enforced temporariness as a feature of TLMPs: “The obvious cases in which temporary 
migration is non-voluntary are all those programs by which migrants are forced to return to 
their country of origin after a fixed period of residence abroad as guest workers” (forthcoming). 
In our view, this stance is self-defeating, as it would imply that temporary migrants could only 
realize their goals if they were accepted into permanent immigration programmes and could 
freely choose whether and how long to stay. Instead of considering only what conditions in the 
host society would allow temporary migrants to pursue their life plans and remain free in 
changing them, we believe that TLMPs should aim to achieve a triple benefit and must thus 
factor in the interests of host and origin countries alongside those of the migrants. If they fail 
to do so, states will not be motivated to provide opportunities for temporary labour migration in 
the first place.  
An alternative view could consider TLMPs as second-best options under non-ideal 
conditions where state borders are not fully open (e.g. Chang 2002). Enforced temporariness 
would then only be acceptable conditionally because rich states fail to comply with their moral 
duties to open their borders for immigration from poor countries whose citizens enjoy fewer 
opportunities because of their morally arbitrary circumstances of birth (Carens 2013). If the 
goal is open borders, then one might consider free movement arrangements between states 
(such as those in place in the European Union) in the current world as approximating this ideal. 
By contrast, TLMPs can hardly be justified as a step towards open borders since they are 
premised on destination states’ immigration control and impose limits on migrants’ right to stay.  
While we endorse the widening of free movement opportunities, we do not believe that this 
is an alternative to, or substitute for TLMPs. Free movement areas are typically created 
between countries with comparable levels of average incomes.8 In contrast, TLMPs open up 
legal migration channels between states set apart by great disparities with regard to their levels 
of economic opportunities and social citizenship. In democratic states, governments have a 
 
7 Intended temporariness is also foregrounded in the definition offered by the EU’s European Migration Network 
that defines temporary migration as “migration for a specific motivation and/or purpose with the intention that, 
afterwards, there will be a return to country of origin or onward movement” (EMN 2011: 14). 
8 They exist not only between relatively wealthy states, like EU member states, Australia and New Zealand, but 
also among middle income states, such as the MERCOSUR countries in South America, and low income 
states in the case of ECOWAS in West Africa and of the East African Union.  
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mandate to promote the common good of their citizens and residents and they cannot be 
expected to open up borders for free movement from states with vastly lower levels of 
opportunities and welfare. They must be able to show that admitting economic migrants 
benefits not only these migrants and their countries of origin but also their own populations. 
Where disparities are small, free movement can be defended on precisely these grounds; 
where they are large, only controlled immigration can potentially meet the triple benefit 
condition.  
Furthermore, immigration control is not merely justified on grounds of a priority of domestic 
social justice, but also because controlled migration makes it possible to address the interests 
of sending countries and migrants. It allows to do this through governance mechanisms instead 
of expecting them to be taken care of by the invisible hand of uncoordinated individual choices 
of migrants, their families and host country employers. Free movement is not always optimal 
to realize benefits for source countries as shown by the example of the EU where EU 
enlargement in the 2000s has significantly enhanced East-West labour mobility leading to 
severe depopulation and loss of skilled workers in some new member states (Krastev and 
Holmes 2019). Under non-ideal world conditions, immigration control is thus not a regrettable 
fact resulting from wealthy states’ failure to comply with their moral duties to open their borders, 
as Carens would see it; it is instead a fundamental premise of the duties that such states have 
not only towards their own citizens but also towards people in poorer countries. 
If the migrants participating in TLMPs do not have a normative claim to free movement, 
what kind of admission claims do they have? Unlike asylum seekers or family members of 
settled refugees and immigrants, temporary labour migrants do not have individual admission 
rights. Instead, their admission requires (different types of) consent by all three actors. Migrants 
themselves can apply and need to be accepted by destination states, or they can be invited 
through active recruitment and need then to consent. By contrast, because of the fundamental 
human right to leave any country, the source country must not control, and thus does not have 
to consent to, the participation of individual migrants in a TLMP. Instead, it is essential that 
source countries have a say in the general conditions under which their citizens live and work 
abroad and can act to protect them when their rights are violated. This applies particularly to 
the case of low skilled labour migrants. Programmes for the temporary migration of highly 
skilled migrants or international students are less likely to be associated with exploitative 
conditions for migrants (although some degree of exploitation can also occur in these 
programmes, see e.g. Costa 2017). Here, interests of sending countries that ought to be taken 
into account concern mainly the so-called brain drain that can occur under certain 
circumstances and a fair return on their investment into the human capital of these migrants.  
Although TLMPs require these forms of mutual consent and temporary migrants do not 
have individual admission rights, it does not follow that destination states are under no 
obligation to admit any temporary labour migrants at all. Even ‘weakly cosmopolitan theories’ 
agree that wealthy countries of the Global North share responsibilities for securing 
fundamental human rights and the satisfaction of basic human needs in the Global South 
(Miller 2016). Development economists have convincingly demonstrated that temporary 
migrants’ remittances contribute more to poverty reduction and human development in low-
income countries than Official Development Assistance (e.g. World Bank 2017). Under these 
circumstances, opening up temporary labour migration programs can become an important 
way how rich states can alleviate poverty and improve the situation in other parts of the world. 
This argument runs counter to intuitions that destination states cannot be duty-bound to do 
something that is anyway in their self-interest. Yet duty and self-interest are two rationales for 
action that do not exclude each other. Partners in a cooperative scheme participate because 
they expect to benefit but also have duties of fairness to ensure that the other participants 
benefit as well. In the case of North-South relations, there are additional asymmetric duties 
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that rich countries in the North have towards poor ones in the South. If they can meet these at 
least partially through well-designed TLMPs without thereby damaging their self-interests, this 
removes an important cost and feasibility excuse for shunning their global justice duties and 
strengthens the case for temporary labour migration programs.9 
Let’s take stock of our normative conclusions so far. We have argued that migrants’ 
participation in TLMPs must be voluntary and can be regarded so if these programmes match 
their own temporary migration projects. Migrants do not have individual claims to be admitted 
under such programmes but wealthy destination states may still have special and global justice 
duties to provide ample opportunities for temporary migration. The triple win justification 
ensures that destination states can legitimately give priority to the promotion of opportunities 
and social rights of their own citizens and residents, but it obliges them also to take into account 
the interests of migrants and source countries in the design of such programmes. These 
conclusions deviate significantly from most of the existing normative literature. However, they 
are not yet very specific and leave the content of TLMPs and the conditions under which 
temporary labour migration can be regarded as satisfying a triple benefit justification wide 
open.  
5. Democratic legitimacy conditions for TLMPs 
We explore therefore a second normative perspective that complements principles of justice 
with those of democratic legitimacy. This perspective brings several problems into focus. First, 
decisions on TLMPs adopted unilaterally by a destination state have large spill-over effects on 
other countries and their citizens. Second, once inside the country, temporary migrants are 
fully subjected to the host country’s laws and coercive state power but they are not adequately 
represented in the making of these laws and, as pointed out by Ottonelli and Torresi (2010), 
may actually not be interested in host country politics because of their plans to stay only 
temporarily. Third, temporary migrants are citizens of their countries of origin and may need to 
rely on these countries’ governments for protection of their interests, but often find that their 
absentee status diminishes their political clout or that home country governments use them 
only instrumentally for their own economic or political purposes.  
TLMPs raise issues of democratic inclusion and representation and the interests that the 
three actors bring to the negotiations must therefore be vetted for their democratic legitimacy. 
There has been a vigorous debate among political theorists about competing principles of 
inclusion. We adopt a pluralist view and propose that democratic legitimacy requires combining 
three distinct principles, each of which has different scopes and domains of application 
(Bauböck 2018).  
The first of these principles is the inclusion of all relevant affected interests. This principle 
responds to the question of whose interests need to be taken into account in a collectively 
binding decision. It applies specifically to extraterritorial spillover effects of decisions taken by 
one particular polity. Interpreted in the right way, the principle does not call for including those 
whose interests are affected as citizens and voters in the polity taking the decision. Instead, it 
requires an adequate representation of interests in the deliberation before the decision or in 
the decision itself. On many policies that have negative extraterritorial effects, consulting the 
governments of other affected states and NGOs representing the interests of affected 
populations may be enough to generate legitimacy for the decision.  
 
9 David Owen suggests a slightly weaker conclusion that while an argument along these lines “… is not 
sufficient to generate an obligation on liberal states to admit labour migrants, it does provide pro tanto reasons 
for selections in admissions that best support the realization of global justice” (Owen 2021). 
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Some authors have also argued that the affected interests principle applies only to negative 
effects, as outsiders can be assumed to agree to receiving a benefit.10 If a country does not 
comply with carbon emission targets and thereby harms the future of humankind it can be 
legitimately pushed by outsiders to change its policy, but if it adopts a policy that reduces its 
emissions below an agreed and fair target, then outsiders should not have a say in deciding 
how it does so. However, the triple benefit of TLMPs is not of this kind. As we have argued 
above, benefits for migrants and sources countries do not come about as side-effects of 
TLMPs unilaterally adopted by destination states and pursuing only their economic self-
interest. Instead, triple benefits can only be secured through cooperation. We propose 
therefore that the democratic principle of including affected interests calls for international 
decision-making procedures on TLMPs in which the interests of destination states, origin 
states and migrants are fairly represented.  
The second principle, which has – in our view wrongly – been considered as a rival to that 
of including affected interests is that of including all persons subject to the law and/or coercive 
political power. This principle provides legitimacy to restrictions of individual autonomy by 
political authorities through demanding that they at the same time secure this autonomy 
through constitutionalized liberties and by enabling individuals to contest these authorities. 
This principle has generally a narrower scope than that of including affected interests, as it 
applies primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular polity, but its domain of 
application is broader as it does not merely concern the legitimacy of particular decisions but 
of the whole system of government institutions and their coercive powers.  
Applied to temporary labour migrants, the principle identifies them as subjected to the law 
and authorities of the host society in a comprehensive way that gives rise to corresponding 
claims to inclusion. In contrast to most authors, however, we do not think that subjection is a 
sufficient condition for a claim to full citizenship status. The case of temporary labour migrants 
illustrates this point. On the one hand, they are not transients like tourists, travelling business 
people or border commuters who are also subjected to the law but whose presence in the 
territory is less essential for their life projects. On the other hand, they are also not like settled 
immigrants and native-born residents who locate the centre of their future lives in the territory. 
For that reason, they do not have a claim to citizenship and voting rights in the host country. 
Yet they do have claims to equal protection by the laws to which they are subjected as well as 
to contestation of these laws (e.g. through staging protests). The ‘all-subjected principle’ is not 
compatible with the view that temporary migrants’ rights can be entirely derived from 
agreements fleshed out in negotiations representing all affected interests. Nor can the content 
of such rights be fully determined by considering how their life plans ought to be 
accommodated by host states, as Ottonelli and Torresi propose. Both of these considerations 
will play an important role in justifying deviations from a standard of equal rights for workers 
and residents in the host society. But before justifying deviations, we first need to assert a 
default standard of equality. The principle of equal protection by the law for all subjected to the 
law provides that standard.  
The third and final principle is that of including all citizenship stakeholders. It identifies those 
individuals whose lives are linked to a particular polity in such a way that they have a claim to 
full citizenship status. We suggest that – unlike long-term settled immigrants – temporary 
migrants generally do not have a claim to citizenship in their host countries. They may, 
however, have a claim to citizenship and voting rights at the local level, since local citizenship 
is structurally open for all who take up residence in the municipality – as illustrated by local 
voting rights for mobile EU citizens but also for third country nationals in many European and 
South American states (Pedroza 2019). We think that offering local citizenship and voting 
 
10 See Bengtson (2020) for a rejection of the idea that only negatively affected interests must be included.  
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rights to temporary migrants is important as it provides them with additional protection –
symbolically through a status of temporary membership and practically through the attention 
that candidates have to pay to the interests of potential voters – even if these do not turn out 
in large numbers, as temporary migrants are unlikely to do. More important is, however, the 
claim of temporary migrants to effective citizenship in their countries of origin. As temporary 
absentees they should not lose their voting rights and as a particularly vulnerable ‘diaspora’ 
group they need effective consular and diplomatic protection. Because they are and remain 
citizens, countries of origin also have special duties to assist them in realizing their life plans 
through facilitating remittances, return migration, and reintegration after return.  
Principles of democratic inclusion can in this way fill some of the gaps that a normative 
account based on principles of justice leaves open. They explain why the content of TLMPs 
should be determined by negotiations in which the affected interests of source countries and 
migrants themselves are fairly represented, why and in which respect temporary migrants can 
claim equal treatment with other residents in the host society and why they have claims to 
transnational citizenship, which include membership at the local level in the host country and 
citizenship rights in the sending state.  
6. Conclusions  
This paper has argued that temporary labour migration programmes are caught in a dilemma 
between requirements of domestic justice in migrant receiving states that call for maintaining 
equal rights and standards of social justice for all subjected to the laws of the country and 
global justice duties of wealthy states to provide more opportunities for (temporary) migration 
from poorer countries. Where cross-country disparities of economic development and social 
rights are very large, free movement would undermine the capacity of states to deliver 
domestic social justice. Regulated temporary migration can, however, be justified as a 
response to the dilemma, if it provides benefits for receiving states, sending states and the 
migrants themselves.  
However, what counts as relevant benefits is difficult to determine ex ante. The impacts of 
TLMPs on the three actors involve possible gains and losses for each of them. Moreover, 
achieving triple benefits also depends on cooperation between the actors and cannot be 
expected if each aims to maximize their own interests without coordinating with the other actors 
involved. We have therefore proposed that triple benefits can only be achieved if TLMPs are 
negotiated and governed in such a way that all affected interests are fairly represented. This 
conclusion is supported by our interpretation of the democratic principle of including all affected 
interests. Under such conditions, some rights of temporary migrant workers in host countries 
can be regarded as a legitimate outcome of negotiations, while others need to be fixed in 
advance under a democratic principle of equal protection of all subjected to the laws. It is not 
our ambition in this paper to list those rights that are conditions for fair TLMPs and those that 
can be flexibly negotiated. Our aim is instead to show that the domestic vs. global justice 
dilemma can be addressed in this way even though it cannot be fully overcome.  
Our paper provides a new normative framework for discussing the desirability of TLMPs, 
and for debating their design and implementation in practice. As such, it raises many issues 
that require further research and analysis. To conclude, we highlight briefly three important 
practical issues and challenges that arise when trying to fairly negotiate and govern a TLMP 
along the lines we have suggested. Two of these challenges emerge from the problem of 
structural asymmetries of power between the three categories of actors that must be 
addressed to ensure procedural fairness. The first asymmetry is that between wealthy 
receiving countries and poor sending states, the second is that between states that are by their 
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very nature organisations representing collective interests vis-à-vis other states and migrants 
that lack representation of their special interests.  
One way of overcoming the asymmetric dominance of destination states in negotiations 
about TLMPs would be to involve international organisations (such as the International Labour 
Organisation or the International Organization for Migration, two UN agencies) as convenors 
of the discussions, which could thus be conducted as multilateral negotiations where 
destination and origin states have formally equal powers. In such a setup, the international 
organisations’ role would be to facilitate deliberations among what are meant to be equal 
parties in the negotiation, without actively supporting one side or another. While it would be 
naïve to think that the involvement of an international organisation as a convenor would 
eliminate power asymmetries between rich destination countries and poorer sending states, it 
may go some way toward reducing them. This might be especially the case if TLMPs are 
negotiated between groups of destination and origin countries and/or if TLMPs are negotiated 
as part of wider migration policy agreements that include areas where origin countries have 
more leverage (e.g. as part of attempts to reduce irregular migration through cooperative 
policies between destination, origin and transit countries).  
The second challenge, which is how to best represent the interests of temporary labour 
migrants in multilateral negotiations about TLMPs, is equally important and difficult to address. 
The problem is that temporary labour migrants do not have their own organizations to represent 
them and are less motivated to spend time and resources for creating them than other 
categories of workers. Therefore, they need vicarious representation through, for example, 
NGOs.11 Involving NGOs in decision-making processes is often criticized by arguing that they 
lack democratic legitimacy. In our view, this critique is less convincing where direct 
representation cannot be achieved and when the issue at stake needs to be addressed through 
transnational governance rather than domestic government (Macdonald 2008). Identifying an 
NGO that is suitable for this purpose is, however, not a straightforward issue, as many of the 
existing civil society organisations dealing with labour migration are focused on representing 
specific groups of migrant workers or specific aspects of labour migration and protection.  
In the negotiation of TLMPs, migrants ought to be represented not only in discussions but 
also in the decision-making, possibly through some kind of veto power. Multilateral TLMPs 
involving several host and source countries offer not only better chances for evening out power 
asymmetries between states, but also for giving representatives of temporary labour migrants 
an effective voice in the negotiations. NGOs representing migrants and IOs acting as 
conveners of the discussions should also have a strong role at the implementation stage where 
they could be in charge of independent monitoring of these agreements.  
A third important issue relates to non-democratic countries. Our approach may be described 
as semi-(non)-ideal theory in the sense that we presuppose a non-ideal context of global 
distributive injustice with large discrepancies of opportunity between countries in the global 
South and global North. At the same time, we have assumed that governments in destination 
and origin countries will adequately represent the best interests of their citizens and that they 
accept fundamental principles of democratic inclusion. Real-world liberal democracies often 
fail to meet these assumptions, but they are at least normatively committed to them. By 
contrast, non-democratic states involved in TLMPs may reject the conceptions of domestic 
justice and democratic legitimacy that inform our normative argument. On the one hand, we 
accept that our normative argument has limited purchase for TLMPs concluded between 
governments lacking democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, we remain optimistic that 
 
11 Additionally, former temporary migrants could also represent current and future ones, for example in mini-
publics that have to vet a proposed TLMP before it can be adopted by states. We thank David Owen for this 
suggestion.  
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“model TLMPs” worked out between democratic states and international organisations might 
provide new standards that could eventually also be accepted by non-democratic destination 
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